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Abstract  
 Morocco has long maintained stability in a region historically known for fluctuating 
sociopolitical climates, considerably in part to a robust constitutional monarchy. However, the 20 
February movement that coincided with the 2011 Arab Spring showed that the government is 
vulnerable to an energetic, organized, and a vocal youth population. Now, seven years after a 
constitutional referendum aimed at installing more democratic processes was passed, the growing 
youth populous feel more detached from their nation than ever, ignored by the government and 
monarchy, and ultimately lacking a voice in Moroccan politics. By excluding their voice and 
ignoring their opinions, the government is failing the young people of Morocco whose discontent 
could manifest itself in a far more disruptive movement in the coming years than it did in 2011.  
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i. Introduction  
 The origins of the Moroccan experience go back centuries and has spanned several 
dynasties, countless Kings, as well as Spanish and French colonization which left the nation 
tattered. Throughout its history, two elements have remained pertinent in Morocco; Islam and the 
monarchy. Each goes hand in hand, and by that, the King wields near absolute authority by the 
grace of Islam. However, when the Arab Spring struck the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, 
King Mohammed VI’s authority was challenged. The King was forced to call for a constitutional 
referendum or risk further unrest. Following this, democratic reforms were established to give 
parliament and in theory, the populous, more authority. However, this does not seem to be the 
case. In contemporary post-20 February 2011 Moroccan society, young people make up a 
significant portion of this populous and therefore represent a vast political contingent, but are they 
genuinely being granted a voice in the civics of the nation?  
 Given the research question above, I conjecture that youth participation in Moroccan 
politics is alarmingly low, particularly in relation to voting and involvement in political 
organizations. Many young Moroccans feel marginalized and controlled by the government 
despite the constitutional reforms in 2011, henceforth excluding a large demographic from the 
democratic processes of the Kingdom. With relation to this, the following study will look at levels 
of political involvement among young Moroccans ages 19 to 23 around three areas of political 
input: voting, party membership, and non-governmental participation, and whether or not this 
demographic feel included in the political arena within the context of Morocco’s hybrid-regime. 
 This paper will first take a historical look at Morocco, from its early beginnings up until 
the modern day, to give context to the social and political climates surrounding the government 
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and the young people. Subsequently, the paper will move towards the presentation of the findings 
in conversations with Moroccan university students on their sentiments towards the question at 
hand. 
 
ii. Early Beginnings of Maghrib  
 Tucked away in the Northwest corner of Africa, Morocco is seemingly detached from the 
heart of the Arab world yet embodies the Islamic values and traditions inherent to the Middle East. 
The earliest tracings of Moroccan history date back to sometime in the eighth century. The name 
“al-Maghrib al-Aqsa” emerged sometime after that, which in Arabic means “Muslims furthest 
West or Morocco” (Bouqria, & Miler, 1999, p.19). Henceforth, one can see how the roots of 
Islamic tradition span back centuries. The first Moroccan Monarchy was established in 789 by a 
descendant of the Prophet Mohammed and would last until 959. The subsequent two dynasties 
took great strides in making Morocco a nation by legitimizing power in a central authority by the 
doctrine of Islamic jihad; they lasted from 1069 to 1147 and 1147 to 1269 respectively. The fourth 
and fifth dynasties, the Banu Marin (1258-1420) and the Sa’di (1548-1641) introduced new 
diplomatic practices in the civics of their kingdoms by doing away with the more aggressive means 
of public engagement contrary to their predecessors. These two dynasties ultimately connected 
with the population on a more personal level and formulated a relationship between the public and 
the crown that would stand the test of time, but this would be a relationship, as we will later 
explore, is deeply fractured in the eyes of the public, particularly by young people. 
 After 1500, showmanship and lavish rituals were employed by the monarchy as a means 
of legitimizing the crown and positioning it at the forefront of public consciousness. One of the 
most significant traditions began in 1593 by King al-Mansur, who established the performance of 
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the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday. Al-Mansur established such a tradition in order to secure the 
lineage from the Prophet Mohammed in his dynasty as to be reflected in the public eye. A 
significant precedent he established during this lavish celebration was the white-rob of the ruler, 
in which the ruler wore the same white robs as every man in Morocco, built a strong link between 
him and the common man. Al-Mansur’s tradition of the Prophet’s birthday carried through the 
centuries and is still viewed as a powerful tool that legitimizes and connects the monarch to his 
people but is one that has been continuously challenged in the 21st century Morocco (Bouqria, & 
Miler, 1999, p.180). Of the many ways that the monarchy came to be in Morocco, its continuity 
has been most active under the sixth and current dynasty that began in 1666, the mighty ‘Alwai 
dynasty.  
 The monarchy and Islam are the two enduring pillars of the Moroccan experience 
throughout the centuries and were utilized in various ways by its six ruling families all while 
maintaining a seemingly homogenous curve. However, this would later be challenged in the 
contemporary by a vastly different youth population. In the subsequent sections, the focus will be 
placed on the ‘Alwai dynasty following their independence from French colonization in 1956, 
mainly looking at the reigns of King Hassan II and King Mohammed VI, who are the primary 
craftsmen of the modern Morocco and where themes of youth involvement in the sociopolitical 
setting are challenged and developed.  
 
iii. King Hassan II: An  Authoritarian Framework  
 Prior to gaining its independence in 1956 from the French Protectorate, Morocco had been 
divided into three main zones of colonial influence between the French, Spanish, and an 
international coalition that controlled a smaller region around Tangier. King Mohammed V, who 
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negotiated for the independence of Morocco, was its first monarch and oversaw the reunification 
of these zones during his brief four-year rule as Morocco’s first monarch. It would be his son, 
Hassan II, who would subsequently lay the framework for a contemporary Morocco under 
Mohammed VI. King Hassan II ruled for 38-years, one of the longest out of any Arab monarch, 
and he took the throne at a time when Islamic Kings were seemingly fading into history. King 
Hassan II’s rule, however, was by no means a cherished one in Moroccan history, it is often 
characterized as a dictatorship and is known as the “years of lead” for the brutality of the regime. 
 Nevertheless, King Hassan II knew how to hold onto the support and he did so by 
recognizing the countries’ historic Islamic roots and traditions, and more so, the divisions between 
ethnic groups over such customs. King Hassan II’s success lay in his ability to transcend these 
divisions between rural and rich, Berber and Arab, and the many feudal tribes; he had “the ability 
to be different things to different people” (Gregory, 1999). Hassan II also attempted to democratize 
the country by introducing a new constitution in 1962, which provided elections for legislature but 
ultimately left the majority of power in the crown, given that these elections were never truly fair. 
Furthermore, Hassan II understood the historical importance of his position to the people, as the 
crown was a unifying force in Islamic society, and he truly did just that. As the Commander of the 
Faithful, he quadrupled the number of mosques over his tenure and played to the religious wills of 
the people all while strengthening the hand of the crown towards absolutism. By many measures, 
Hassan II did indeed rule with an iron fist and left a stain in the conscious of the nation. The 
aforementioned “years of lead” is the term most Moroccans would assimilate with the period of 
King Hassan II’s reign. It was a period dominated by repression, marginalization, and torture. The 
monarchy targeted political opponents and framed them as rebels, and it suppressed Western 
Saharan activists, students and teachers, the press, and progressive ideology as a whole. All the 
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while, King Hassan II pleaded ignorance to torture or disappearances of such individuals, 
essentially shoving under the rug thousands of grotesque human rights abuses.  
Despite his smeared record on human rights, King Hassan II did manage to keep Morocco’s 
kingdom virtually intact during a time in which many other Arab regimes were toppled. He 
administered measured yet consistent economic reforms over his 38-year reign that helped keep 
the Moroccan political elites and royals pleased. Arguably one of Hassan II’s most notable 
achievements were with his foreign policy. Hassan II quietly aligned himself with Western powers 
during his time on the throne, garnering a strong alliance with the United States as well as a few 
of its neighbors in Europe. 
By the end of his reign, King Hassan II had ultimately left a more modernized Morocco, 
one in contrast from its Middle Eastern and North African neighbors. However, it should not be 
mistaken that Hassan II ruled with an iron fist. In the finals years of his rule, there was a slight 
shift away from authoritarianism however in what Hassan himself referred to as a “Hassanian 
democracy,” by which the people enjoyed “widened political freedom” while the King still held a 
tight grasp on decision making (Gregory, 1999). Upon his death, his son would inherit just that, a 
false sense of political freedom among the public undermined by an absolute authority in the 
crown. Conclusively, this is what the subsequent sections of this historical perspective will look 
at, the democratization of Morocco under King Mohammed VI and how the burgeoning youth 
have been represented under it, particularly following the 2011 constitutional referendum.  
 
iv. King Mohammed VI and the Emergent Youth Demographic 
 Following Hassan’s death, King Mohammed VI sought to take Morocco to new heights 
by reforming their social and political institutions. In his first few years at the helm of the 
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monarchy, Mohammed VI made a number of significant moves towards establishing Morocco as 
what would seem to be a more democratic nation. Among the most notable moves was the 
sacking of numerous ministers who had long been suspected of corruption and human rights 
violations as well as the establishment of a free trade agreement between the United States and 
Morocco in 2002, which aimed to facilitate trade between the two nations (Liddell, Monjib, 
2009). Undoubtedly, Mohammed VI’s vision of political liberalization was a refreshing shift 
from the regime-like rule throughout most of King Hassan II’s reign, however in the few years 
prior to the outbreak of Arab Spring, it was evident that Mohammed VI’s monarchy was 
seemingly a continuation of the Hassanian democracy doctrine. However, credit is due to King 
Mohammed VI in the sense that he did vastly improve Morocco’s economic standing as well as 
its record on the human rights spectrum. Nevertheless, Mohammed VI’s oaths of a more 
democratized Morocco in 2011 seemed hollow.  
Democratizing Morocco for King Mohammed VI would mean amending the royal 
mandate, which at the time dictated virtually all “facets of society” and placed absolute authority 
with the King (Liddell, Monjib, 2009). Limiting the royal authority would mean giving more 
authority to Parliament. However, the crown has never truly done so since King Mohammed VI 
took the throne, and in 2011, it seemed that there was no intention to do so either. Nevertheless, 
King Mohammed VI continued to wield absolute authority over the nation’s decision making in 
his first decade in office and showed little difference from his predecessor in the sense that he 
continued to silence public opposition to the crown. The King tried to present the Moroccan 
government as more transparent and democratic, but many could see straight through the 
puppeteering of the crown. In 2008, the Party for Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) was 
founded, backed by the crown, and finished first place in local elections in 2009 across the 
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board. Of course, the founding member of PAM was the ex-Deputy Interior Minister, Fouad Ali 
El Himma, a close friend of King Mohammed VI whose party quickly received backing from the 
crown. This is similar to a period under Hassan II, in which there were “partis administratifs,” 
which are parties loyal to the King and utilized to wield complete control over government 
affairs (Liddell, Monjib, 2009). This is a significant reason why the younger generations don’t 
trust political parties, the influence of the King on the political parties essentially delegitimize 
their status in the eyes of young Moroccans. King Mohammed VI would later run into the same 
dilemma that leaders across the Middle East were slapped within 2011: the Arab Spring.  
In the years leading up to the Arab Spring, there is an apparent demographic parallel with 
the rise in social outcry, known as the “youth bulge” (Austin, 2011). In the early half of the 21st 
century, demographics across the Arab world shifted as a result of higher birth rates, socialized 
medical institutions, increased education, and increased wealth rates. The result was the most 
advanced youth population in the Middle East and North African history set to challenge the 
conventional sociopolitical structure in the countries of these regions. Parallel to the swell in 
youth population was (and still is) a high rate of youth unemployment and limited outlets for 
political input (Austin, 2011). These two juxtaposing trends ultimately catalyzed themselves into 
larger youth social movements. This demographical phenomenon emerged at a time of 
flourishing globalization, seemingly trapping the youth bubble in patriarchal autocracies 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The following section will look more at how the 
youth bulge manifested itself within Morocco and how the resulting 20th February movement 
forced the hand of the government.  
 
v. A New Youth in Morocco 
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 The intersectionality of the Moroccan youth identity with the state in the modern context 
is quite complex. When Mohammed VI ascended the throne in 1999, the expectations were a 
shift away from the authoritarian tendencies of his father. Accordingly, that state trended towards 
modernizing its institutions; education being at the forefront. Increasing knowledge, in turn, 
increased social mobility whereas young Moroccans born in the early 1990s and onwards had a 
heightened social, political, and economic awareness. This is where the youth under King 
Mohammed VI and say, the older generations, who grew up under Hassan II, differ significantly. 
Young Moroccans expect more: better education, welfare, jobs with good wages, etc., 
Additionally, with more social freedom under King Mohammed VI, comes more individualism 
and a realization of family and social values, which are inherently hierarchical and essentially 
monopolize power dynamics in Morocco. Henceforth, youth dissatisfaction grew in the early 
2000s and coupled with technological advancements, social media, and access to both, 
accumulated in social movements like the 20 February Movement, where youth began to 
separate from the traditional youth ideals of the past. The following sections will take a more in-
depth look at the 20 February Movement and the Arab Spring in Morocco, the Constitutional 
Referendum, and youth inclusion in the social, political, and economic domains following 2011.  
 
vi. 20 February Movement in the Context of the Arab Spring 
  Aforementioned, youth discord with the state in the late 90s and 2000s was a result of a 
transitioning kingdom from an authoritarian regime to an expectedly more open and democratic 
one. Youth expected more social freedoms and welfare, and when expectations weren’t met, they 
mobilized in high numbers during the first decade of the 21st century. A study conducted by 
sociologist Abderrahmane Rachik in 2014 found that protest movements, events, and actions 
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regardless of their nature “rose significantly between 2005 and 2012. Indeed, the number of protest 
actions rose from 700 in 2005, an average of two sit-ins per day, to 5,091 in 2008, 6,438 in 2009 
and to 8,600 in 2010” (Akesbi, 2016). This was partially a result of increased political freedom of 
speech ushered by reforms from King Mohammed VI in his early years as rulers. Such protest 
actions would have been heavily suppressed under Hassan II, but the public clearly felt more 
empowered under the new king to speak out about issues in society, particularly the lack of 
democratic reforms that were assumed with King Mohammed VI’s rule. Although protest actions 
were allowed, the crown still censored gregarious social movements through soft 
authoritarianism.      
Exacerbating youth dissent against the government and crown during this time in the first 
decade of the 21st century is the actuality that youth are fundamentally excluded from political 
parties and politics. The King has repeatedly called for more youth inclusion both, before and after 
the Arab Spring, yet youth activism in party politics has been feeble, and only the PI, USPF and 
the PJD have youth divisions in their parties. Even though a bill in 2006 passed through parliament 
to specify a “proportion of youth and women in their organizational structures,” political parties 
did not obey the law when forming their national assemblies (Akesbi, 2016). Therefore, one can 
conjecture the detachment that many young people feel with regards to the government. Many 
young Moroccans found themselves being marginalized by the political elite and being excluded 
from modes of upward mobility that they so much desire; such sentiments still remain strong 
among the youth of today. While not necessarily materializing themselves in the same way as 
Morocco did, similar attitudes and social awakenings among youth and young adults coincided 
across the Middle East.  
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The Arab Spring, now infamous for the widespread shakeup it caused in a multitude of 
Muslim-majority nations, began in Tunisia early in 2011. Longtime incumbent President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown in January of 2011 after widespread protests against his 
suspected corruption and scandals. Ben Ali ruled for over two decades until the Tunisian people 
rose up against him. Less than a month later, Ben Ali’s Egyptian counterpart, Hosni Mubarak was 
overthrown in Cairo. Mubarak, similar to Ben Ali, ruled for three decades. Young Moroccans, 
through social media and television, saw many of their same grievances played out in massive 
protests in Tunisia and Egypt that took down the individuals most responsible for such repression. 
Soon after, Morocco’s own youth called for a widespread protest against the crown and the 
parliament, and thus the 20th February movement came to be in early 2011.  
As mentioned before, the displeasures of young Moroccans had been boiling for quite some 
time prior to 2011, and the early beginnings of the movement were formulated in 2009. Social 
networking sites became a hub for young people to organize social justice and individual freedom 
groups that were initially an outlet for people to speak out about issues generally censored in public 
arenas. The beginnings of the 20 February Movement can be generalized as an ‘underground’ 
movement by which much of the organization went unbeknownst to the government. The most 
prominent actors in these arenas were students or graduates in their twenties in major cities, 
primarily Rabat and Casablanca (Sika, 2017). Hence, these two cities are where the 20 February 
Movement, and its proceeding protests, were centralized in. On February 20th, 2011, thousands of 
Moroccans went to the streets, chiefly in Rabat and Casablanca, to peacefully protest against the 
government and call for the King to relinquish some of his powers. Similar protests erupted in 
cities across the country and for the most part, remained peaceful. This is notable in the sense that 
the state allowed for such protests without any fundamental repression, which is seemingly rare 
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given the nature of the protesters’ message. According to Maati Monjib, a political historian at the 
University of Rabat, "It's the first time in Morocco that the king was openly criticized, and they 
didn't shoot people," and instead Mohammed VI promised to bring change to Morocco and answer 
the call of the people (Lewis, 2011). What the people demanded in streets was a more democratic 
government, one in which the power to rule is not solely vested in the palace, and instead, the 
Prime Minister, his cabinet, and Parliament would have more democratic powers. 
  
 
 
vii. Constitutional Referendum, Real Change?  
The King and his government responded swiftly to the demands of the people and agreed 
to draft a constitutional referendum. On July 1st, 2011, the constitutional referendum was held in 
which millions of Moroccans turned out and overwhelmingly voted to reform the constitution, 
with 98.5 percent of the voters approving of the alterations to the law (Ghafar, Jacobs, 2017). 
The most notable changes are as follows: The King is required to name a Prime Minister from 
the ruling party, the Prime Minister is given the power to dissolve Parliament as well as preside 
over the Government Council, Parliament is given much more oversight over national issues, and 
their share of power is to be expanded, Women are granted social, civic, and political equality, 
and Berber was added as an official language of Morocco. However, did these changes really 
appease the popular wishes of the public, particularly the youth? Essentially no, the King still 
retained overarching authority, and it seems as if the referendum was more of a screen between 
the people and the state rather than a structural alteration of government authority. So rather than 
seizing the opportunity to establish more democratic processes and more democratic institutions, 
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the King essentially reaffirmed Morocco as an autocratic state where he retains overall decision 
making and control.  
  One significant change in the constitution catalyzed by the 20 February Movement was 
this addition of a youth quota in parliament. Throughout the first half of 2011, youth groups had 
lobbied the King for increased representation of young leaders in parliament. In the revised 
constitution that was ratified on July 1st, a new political quota in parliament was established in 
which “sixty seats for women and thirty seats for male candidates under 40 years of age in the 
Moroccan House of Representatives” (Belschner, 2018). According to a study done by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union in 2016, 14.7% of members in Morocco’s parliament were under the age of 
40, while just 1.6% were under the age of 30 (Youth participation in national parliaments, 2016). 
These percentages are not abnormal with relation to other countries nor are they a measurement 
of political participation, but relative to the percentage of the population under the age of 40 in 
Morocco, this does illustrate that there is a vastly under-represented portion of the people in 
parliament.  
As aforementioned, the inclusion of women and young people in parliament was 
prioritized by the King early on as a way to please the demands of advocates from both groups. 
In doing so, he had positioned himself as an ally to both young people and women. However, 
this policy was seemingly employed by political elites as a tool to stabilize the turbulent climate 
of 2011 as well as further legitimize the autocratic power in the monarchy rather than a 
fundamental step to include youth in Rabat’s political sphere. Moreover, the most significant 
supporters among youth were from  “a limited circle of members from the youth wings of 
political parties, who should rather be framed as part of the domestic political elites” (Belschner, 
2018).  
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While the addition of the youth and women quota in the 2011 Constitutional Referendum 
represented a step in the right direction for many young Moroccans, it was greatly overshadowed 
by the lack of structural change actually put forth. On paper, it appears that the palace’s control 
of the country is loosened, and more power is transferred to parliament, and to some extent it 
was. The referendum created a “space” that would’ve allowed political parties to better take 
advantage of the constitutional powers the referendum gave them and more so, include youth 
supporters in the conversation. In the years after the referendum, the political elite engulfed 
themselves in quarreling party politics and reaffirmed a continuation of King Mohammed VI as 
the “central holder of power” in Morocco, additionally showing the weakness of the 
parliamentary system and the democratic system in the wake of the 2011 Constitutional 
Referendum (Desrues, 2011). Conclusively, the social movements and constitutional changes 
that took place in 2011 had a passion and fury to them but this feeling seems to have faded into 
history as young people now feel disenfranchised by their government and are losing faith in 
their nation.  
 
viii. Evaluating the Current State of the Youth Voice  
 The present state of disenchantment among young people in Morocco vests itself heavily 
in this belief that their opinions, desires, and votes simply do not count. Corruption has long 
plagued parliament and even following 2011, nothing seemed to really change. Thus, young 
Moroccans have placed blame in political elites, essentially grouping together politicians, 
businessmen and women, and royal officials as an organization of oppressive oligarchs all working 
under the King. This has been popular sentiment both before and after 2011, however, after the 
referendum it appears that society folded on the idea of ousting these elites and instead 
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sociopolitical participation has dropped off, particularly among young people, which was evident 
in 2016’s parliamentary elections. The reasoning for lack of involvement among younger 
Moroccan’s in the polls is seamlessly illustrated by this excerpt from The Economist (More of the 
Same? Elections in Morocco, 2016):  
 
Outside the central train station in Rabat, Bilal, an urbane 32-year-old, said he hadn’t voted, 
“because I don’t believe it would change anything.” As with many young people, he 
supported the 2011 protests; but the momentum towards democracy which followed the 
Arab Spring has been replaced by disenfranchisement and a reluctance on the part of the 
government to challenge the monarchy.  
 
The poor participation is ultimately an energetic show of the discord among younger voters who 
believe their ideas and concerns are not being heard and this is where the actual problem lies in 
that the government is not addressing the major issues that the general population is concerned 
about, particularly jobs and the economy. 
 Unemployment in Morocco has wavered above 9% for the last few years and is unusually 
low among younger individuals. This is why the prominent Unemployed Graduates Movement 
emerged, to address the high unemployment among university graduates who are skilled workers 
that the state is just not putting to use. In 2018, even on a good turnout on Rabat’s Mohammed V 
avenue outside parliament, the movement, and movements alike, seems to be losing the fight in 
convincing parliament to address their concerns. The lack of interest by the government in the 
voice of the youth has been a catalyst for young Moroccan’s desire to leave the country and shows 
the faltering structure in the national unity. However, the fact of the matter is that young 
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Moroccan’s do not have high mobility to leave the country for say Europe or the United States to 
seek employment or educational opportunities unless of course, they are among the very wealthy. 
Just two months ago of the coast of Tangier, a 22-year-old Moroccan girl, who was also a law 
student, was shot and killed by the Royal Navy while trying to illegally migrate to Spain, erupting 
widespread outrage from young people across the country (Moroccan woman dies after navy 
shoots at migrant boat, 2018). Moreover, this sense of disdain for the government among young 
people was only exacerbated when the government reinstated the compulsory military service for 
Moroccan men and women ages 19 to 25 back in August. Morocco’s Ministerial Council, which 
is headed by the King, approved the reinstatement of the draft in an effort to “promote patriotism 
among the young, within the framework of the correlation between the rights and responsibilities 
of citizenship” (Eljechtimi, 2018). What is interesting is that the King seemingly took the position 
that this measure was one to ensure employment for “unemployed people” and the young 
generation “who find it extremely hard to access the job market” (Eljechtimi, 2018). The fact of 
the matter is that this policy came directly from the King, not for economic purposes but instead 
as a nationalistic measure to essentially further limit young people from leaving Morocco. The 
action was also seen as a way to increase the King’s hand against possible young social movements 
that could lead to unrest in the near feature, which has been most evident in regions such as the 
Rif. Fundamentally, by placing youth in a year’s worth of compulsory military service, the 
government disrupts movements and also takes away a great deal of a young person’s ability to 
speak out. Would you speak out against your boss at work? No, and neither would a young man 
or women enlisted in the Moroccan military. This policy is reminiscent of the one King Hassan II 
implemented back in the 1980s in which he drafted student union protesters into the military to 
suppress outcry against the government.  
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 Henceforth, one can see how the government, notably the King, is employing soft 
authoritarianism to more or less suppress youth voice in the sociopolitical spectrum. Therefore, 
what is left behind in contemporary Morocco is a young generation that is angry and disheartened 
with their country but merely have no outlets to express these sentiments. The following sections 
will present and analyze the findings of the research conducted in relation to political involvement 
among young Moroccans in the context of Morocco’s hybrid-regime.  
 
ix. Findings from Conversations with Moroccan University Students  
 The field research of this independent study questioned young Moroccan students enrolled 
in university about their feelings surrounding a set list of questions. Prior to conducting this 
research, my prospects on receiving in-depth feedback were promising but probably a little too 
hopeful. I expected to receive feedback that was thoughtful and offered me results close to similar 
studies I had read on comparable topics. I believed that what I would find would be discontent 
young people shut out by the system but a young people who wanted to change the way things 
were going and change how their voice was treated in Morocco; this was somewhat close to the 
results I received, but ultimately my assumptions were slightly off target.  
 As aforementioned, I structured my interviews and conversations with the students around 
a few select questions which are as follows:  
 
1) Voting 
a) How accessible is voting during Morocco’s elections for people your age? 
b) Do you feel as if your voice and your vote count or does the electoral system seem unfair? 
2) Political Parties 
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a) To what extent are youth involved in political parties? 
3) Non-Governmental Parties 
a) Are there any movements that young Moroccans feel empowered by? 
b) Do you believe there are alternatives ways politics can be run in Morocco? 
4) Governmental Views 
a) How do you feel like the government supports your age group? 
b) Do you like the way Morocco is heading into the future? 
 
 These questions offered a framework around which I could gauge political involvement 
among 19 to 25-year-old students living in Morocco. I chose this demographic because I believed 
that this demographic was the most atypical for “youth.” Additionally, these years for young 
people are generally seen as years of flux, especially for university students who are working 
towards a degree in hopes of establishing a future for themselves. 
  While the questions are broad in nature, this was intentional to help foster more discussion-
based interviews by which I was a facilitator of conversation rather than taking on the role and 
dynamics of an interviewer; this helped produce more candid results given the sensitive context of 
the topic. Furthermore, not all participants were asked every single one of the questions listed, but 
all were asked at least one under each denomination. My aim in this research was to retain as much 
information as possible in the time allotted. Therefore, some questions were omitted for some 
participants.  
 My interviews took place in three different sessions, two in Rabat and one in Tangier and 
covered six interviewees ages 19 to 23, close to the age range I initially aimed for. The two sessions 
in Rabat both last for a total of around two hours each while the one in Tangier was about 30 
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minutes long. The Rabat sessions had five male participants whose ages ranged from 19 to 23, and 
all were students at Rabat’s University Mohammed V. The sole participant in Tangier, a male aged 
21, was unfortunately not even from the north, he was a student from Agadir’s Ibn Zohr University 
in the far south of Morocco. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to add that all six students were all 
relatively a part of the same socioeconomic class, which I would describe as working middle-class 
given that all participants were receiving education yet none of the participants were actively 
working a job on the side. There are some drawbacks to the subjects and research, however. First, 
I obtained no female input on the matter, which vastly biases my answers to a male perspective. 
Secondly, all the subjects were university educated students whose responses are far different from 
individuals of the same age not enrolled in a university. Third, this research does not take in any 
quantitative data; therefore, it is only empirical results rather than numerical. Finally, this project 
just gives a snapshot into the opinions of six young Moroccans, if it were to be conducted again 
and with more time, it would undoubtedly include far more subjects from different sexes, social 
classes, and regions of Morocco. Nevertheless, I was pleased with the following information that 
was recorded.  
 Across the board, the answers I received in the discussions were strikingly similar and 
correlated significantly to what I had retained in readings on the youth generation in Morocco. 
When presenting the results, the names will be redacted, and instead, a pseudonym and age will 
be provided. Consent was verbally given by each participant, and they were informed that the 
findings in this research paper would not be made public.  
 In my conversations with the Moroccan students, I was quite surprised to find that the 
information they provided was similar to what I had initially expected. As mentioned before,  the 
answers were seemingly less articulated than I had hoped for, which may be a fallacy of the 
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language barrier as all the discussions were held in English. Beginning with voting, I was surprised 
to learn that only one of the six individuals had actually voted in an election before. The reasoning? 
Nearly every participant had said something to the nature of “elections are corrupt” or “elections 
are rigged.” While one participant said it was “quite easy” and accessible to vote, he said that it, 
in the end, didn’t matter (S, Boukadir, 23, personal communication, November 14, 2018). This 
was the common theme I found throughout my conversations with the participants, that they have 
no faith in the democratic systems in place. Speaking to this, a participant stated that when you 
vote, “you vote for someone but in the end, the King chooses who is elected” (Z, Kibou, 21, 
personal communication, November 19, 2018). One student summed up why he doesn’t vote 
because Morocco “has no democracy” (A, Alami, 20, personal communication, November 16, 
2018 ). Much of the feedback I got verified my original conjectures by which a considerable 
portion of young people (and the population as a whole) don’t feel the need to vote because they 
believe that their vote just does not matter, which seems to be valid given the near unchallenged 
control that King Mohammed VI maintains over the elections.  
  I found that when I moved my conversations towards involvement in political parties that 
my results became far more dismal, chiefly because none of the students had any formal 
relationship, or interest for that matter, in political parties. I found it interesting that one of the 
individuals said that even for them as second and third-year university students, they did not have 
the proper education required to be formally involved in political parties. Additionally, at least 
three of the participants mentioned the fact that there are very few politicians, let alone political 
parties, that support issues that the youth want them to support such as education reform, jobs, and 
wages. One participant stated that politicians and their political parties only “make changes to help 
themselves rather than helping the public” (Y, Nour, 22, personal communication, November 14, 
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2018). One student also stated that the reason he doesn’t get involved in politics is because there 
is a saying in Morocco that, when translated to English, goes something like “politics are a muddy 
place, and if you get involved you will get dirty, and the mud surrounds you” (Y, Youshi, 19, 
personal communication, November 16, 2018). I speculate that this saying parallels the saying in 
the United States in which many citizens compare Washington D.C. to a “swamp,” where the 
politicians are driven by money and interests, breeding unethicality. Moving over towards 
involvement in social movements, I was again surprised to find that the students had minimal 
interest in any. However, much of their reasoning for not protesting or speaking out publicly 
against the government was out of safety and concern for their future. The student from Tangier 
said that the government “doesn’t want us to organize” while another student stated that “at the 
end of the day” if you protest and are involved in a social movement long enough, the government 
will “suppress you” and there will be “hitting and beating” from the police (S, Boukadir, 23, 
personal communication, November 14, 2018). Nonetheless, nearly all the students expressed their 
support for the on-going boycott of the fuel, dairy, and water products. The Afriquia fuel stop 
chain (owned by Agriculture Minister Aziz Akhanouch), the French dairy brand Centrale Danone, 
and water brand Sidi Alli have all been targeted in an effort to show Moroccan frustration over 
their situations given the heightened prices and government involvement with these goods. 
Conclusively, participation in political parties and social movements goes hand in hand with the 
discussions we had on voting; young people don’t believe that their voice matters in these settings. 
However, the most despondent answers I received were when I brought up overarching issues of 
government support and the outlook for the future. 
 What I found out of the six participants involved is that none were happy with their 
situation in relation to the government. The desire to leave Morocco outweighed any desire to 
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change internal factors. I received answers from “we are depressed” to “everything is shit” (H, 
Lachhab & Y, Nour, 20 & 22, personal communication, November 14, 2018). When asked if they 
think Morocco is heading in the right direction, I overwhelmingly discovered that students and 
young people believe that they are trending downwards and that there are no opportunities even if 
you have a proper education and a degree and that only the wealthy have the upward mobility to 
access good jobs and wages. The outlook among young people in Morocco is pessimistic at best, 
and a lot of the disdain seems to surround the King’s control over the country. One individual said 
that the “King is a criminal and a bad man” and is ultimately the root issue in the country (A, 
Alami, 20, personal communication, November 14, 2018). He controls so much wealth and 
authority yet doesn’t do much to help the people suffering in the streets or the students begging 
for educational and job reform. The youth population feels trapped in Morocco, and they believe 
they can’t do anything about it. This raises the question, what will happen when enough of the 
already discontented population does decide to act? They did it in 2011, and it certainly can happen 
again, possibly on a much more vehement scale.  
 
 
x. Conclusion 
 In understanding contemporary Morocco’s sociopolitical dilemma, it is imperative to point 
out that a significant portion of the tension between the government and the populous stems from 
an atypical youth population that is drastically different from generations of the past. The increase 
in technology and globalization has led to a more individualistic youth, one that sees an expansive 
world full of opportunity and socioeconomic freedom but seemingly out of grasp. The historical 
trajectory of the monarchy has led to an autocratic regime that suppresses youth mobility both in 
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a domestic and international sense unless you are among the political elites that stay close to the 
crown. The foregoing study affirmed my original conjecture that many young Moroccans do 
indeed feel left out by their government, leaving youth participation in civic duties such as voting, 
involvement in the political organization and social movements quite low. This is even more 
troubling given the youth bulge in the nation coupled with dismal economic prospects. So how 
does the country move forward with these two converging experiences? Certainly not by 
compulsory military service for young people.  
 While far-fetched, it would behoove the Moroccan government to listen to the interests of 
the youth on issues like education and economic reform, instead of, as one student put it, focusing 
on changing the clocks. By making structural economic reforms, the country could see a significant 
increase in economic growth on the backs of an educated youth population. However, politicians 
generally follow their own political and economic interests and the fact of the matter is that the 
youth population in Morocco is inherently ignored. The challenge that the growing youth 
population has in the coming years will be making their voice heard, particularly as the migrant 
crisis in north Africa intensifies and more and more Moroccans feel the urge to immigrate in search 
of social and economic opportunities.  
 While the government handled the 20 February movement and the Arab Spring with 
relative ease, it did not solve the overarching issues that were on the conscious of its citizens. The 
task ahead of King Mohammed VI and his government will be one that requires consulting the 
youth and including them in the politics of the country more so than in the past, otherwise the 
populous may revert to more violent means of social activism against the state in order to pave the 
way for the young Moroccans of the future. 
 
Leiter 
 
27 
Bibliography 
Alami, A. (2018, November 16). [Personal interview by the author]. 
Austin, L. (2011). The Politics of Youth Bulge: From Islamic Activism to Democratic Reform in 
the Middle East and North Africa [PDF]. SAIS Review of International Affairs, 31(2). 
https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2011.0019 
Boukadir, S. (2018, November 14). [Personal interview by the author]. 
Bū-Ruqayyaẗ, R., & Miller, S. G. (1999). In the shadow of the sultan: Culture, power, and 
politics in Morocco. Cambridge (Mass.): Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard 
University by Harvard University Press. 
Desrues, T. (2012). Moroccan Youth and the Forming of a New Generation: Social Change, 
Collective Action and Political Activism [PDF]. Mediterranean Politics, 17(1), 23-40. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.655044 
Eljechtimi, A. (2018, August 21). Morocco reinstates compulsory military service for under-25s. 
Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-army/morocco-
reinstates-compulsory-military-service-for-under-25s-idUSKCN1L52DA 
Ghafar, A. A., & Jacobs, A. L. (n.d.). Morocco: The king’s dilemma. Brookings Institute. 
Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/02/morocco-the-kings-
dilemma/ 
Gregory, J. R. (1999, July 24). Hassan II of Morocco Dies at 70; A Monarch Oriented to the 
West. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/24/world/hassan-ii-of-morocco-dies-at-70-a-monarch-
oriented-to-the-west.html 
Kibou, Z. (2018, November 19). [Personal interview by the author]. 
Leiter 
 
28 
Lachhab, H. (2018, November 14). [Personal interview by the author]. 
Liddell, J., & Monjib, M. (n.d.). Morocco’s King Mohammed VI: 10 Years and Counting. 
Brookings Institute. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/moroccos-king-
mohammed-vi-10-years-and-counting/ 
More of the same? Elections in Morocco. (2016, October 15). The Economist. Retrieved from 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/10/15/elections-in-morocco 
Moroccan woman dies after navy shoots at migrant boat. (2018, September 27). The Guardian. 
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/27/moroccan-woman-
buried-after-navy-shoots-at-migrant-boat 
Nour, Y. (2018, November 14). [Personal interview by the author]. 
Sika, N. (2017). Ambiguities of student activism, authoritarianism and democratic attitudes: the 
cases of Egypt and Morocco [PDF]. The Journal of North African Studies, 22(1), 35-29. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2016.1229183 
Spencer, C., Dr. (2016, October 13). Morocco’s Missing Youth [Editorial]. Retrieved from 
Chatham House website: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/morocco-s-
missing-youth 
Youshi, Y. (2018, November 16). [Personal interview by the author]. 
Youth participation in national parliaments 2016. (2016). Retrieved from Inter-Parliamentary 
Union website: http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/youthrep-e.pdf 
Zerhouni, S. (2016, November 22). Morocco: Elections without Democracy [Editorial]. 
Retrieved from The Heinrich Böll Foundation website: 
https://www.boell.de/en/2016/11/22/morocco-elections-without-democracy 
Leiter 
 
29 
Zerhouni, S., & Akesbi, A. (2016, September). Power2Youth: Youth Activism in Morocco: 
Exclusion, Agency and the Search for Inclusion. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). 
 
